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Introduction
With the threat of global warming and the
rapid consumption of the world’s finite oil
supply, sustainability has become a pressing
global concern. Many people are beginning to
more fully understand the imminent conse-
quences of the steady degradation of our planet.
Though many countries have begun addressing
this glaring problem, New Zealand has in many
ways emerged as a forerunner in sustainabil-
ity. With regulatory policies addressing a range
of problems, including renewable energy, CO2
emissions, and (as I will discuss further in this
article) the fishing industry, New Zealand has
pioneered the global adoption of sustainable
practices.
Like many other countries, New Zealand
has experienced a steady decline of its fish stocks
in the absence of fishing regulations; however,
with the establishment of several key laws in the
past twenty years, many of its previously fail-
ing fish populations are now back at sustainable
levels. In this article I will detail several of the
key problems plaguing the global fishing indus-
try and the challenges to solve them. I will then
explain New Zealand’s solution to the prob-
lems in its fishing industry and present the
implications for both the commercial and Maori
fishing sectors. Finally, I will comment on the
weaknesses of the current solution and out-
line several key issues that must be addressed
in the next several years to ensure that New
Zealand’s fish stocks remain sustainable well
into the future.
NEW ZEALAND’S COMMERCIAL
FISHING INDUSTRY: TOO MANY
FISH IN THE SEA?
Kenneth Blanchette
We are seeing the birth of a new perspective of the world, where ecology
and economics are two sides of the same coin.
— Leif Johansson
Common Problems with Fisheries1
New Zealand has more than 300 wild
marine fisheries in its coastal waters, account-
ing for approximately 80 percent of its total fish-
eries. These fisheries are all contained within
New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)2,
which represents approximately 4.4 million
square kilometers of internationally exclusive
fishing rights. (Seafood Industry Council,
“Industry . . .”) As shown in Figure 1, New
Zealand’s EEZ is far larger than its land mass.
While New Zealand’s EEZ is an extremely valu-
able asset, using this resource effectively
requires a full understanding of the core
issues involved.
The Tragedy of the Commons
Prior to New Zealand’s recently enacted
fishing regulations, the country’s fishing indus-
try had become a prime example of a classic eco-
nomic problem: the tragedy of the commons. As
defined by Hardin, the tragedy of the com-
mons describes a situation in which multiple
individuals acting independently in their own
self-interest can ultimately destroy a shared
resource even though it is not in anyone’s long
term interest to do so. (Hardin, p. 1243)
This concept is overtly apparent in New
Zealand’s EEZ. In the past, ocean life had been
assumed to be limitless and inexhaustible; it was
unfathomable to think that humans could ever
harvest fish into extinction. However, with the
new technology and techniques available to
today’s fishermen, this concept is no longer
farfetched. Without any incentive to preserve the
fisheries, fishermen, acting in their own self-
interest, will exhaust the resource. This phenom-
enon, commonly referred to as overfishing,
has very much become a global problem.
Overfishing
As the term implies, overfishing is the
reduction of fish stocks below a sustainable level.
Though it is a relatively simple concept, there are
many different ways to define what a sustain-
able level is. The concept, however, is most eas-
ily understood in purely biological terms. Biolog-
ical overfishing occurs when the fishing mortality
rate reaches a level where the fish stocks have a
negative marginal growth. (Nationmaster)
As stated above, overfishing has become a
global issue. According to Science, about one-
third of all species are currently collapsed.3
While the current state of fisheries is problem-
atic, the bigger threat to these fisheries is the
increasing trend of overfishing. Leading scien-
tists in the field predict that, given the recent
trends, every species of fish will collapse by 2048.
(Bio-Medicine)
In past years, overfishing has hit New
Zealand fisheries particularly hard. For instance,
between 1980 and 1990, orange roughy fish
stocks decreased from 400,000 tons to about
150,000 tons. (Francis and Hilborn, p. 6) Rapid
decreases in fish stocks, such as that of the orange
roughy, not only involve the dying species, but
can also disrupt some of the more delicate aquatic
ecosystems in the New Zealand EEZ.
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1A fishery is a body of water associated with an aquatic
species that is harvested, such an oyster fishery. This defi-
nition, and other general definitions pertaining to fisheries,
are taken from the Louisiana Sea Grant College Program.
2An EEZ is the body of water extending 200 nauti-
cal miles from the coast of a given country within which
exclusive fishing rights exist.
Figure 1. New Zealand’s EEZ
Source: Seafood Industry Council. “Management and
Sustainability.”
3A collapsed species is one that has experienced a
90 percent decline in the total undisturbed catch. The undis-
turbed catch is an approximation of the stock in the absence
of fishing. (Bio-Medicine)
New Zealand’s Commercial
Fishing Industry
The overfishing of NZ fish stocks pre-
sents a difficult situation in which some of the
most marketable fish must be caught sparingly.
Though promoting physical sustainability of the
wild fisheries is important, the New Zealand
government must also allow its fishing com-
panies to compete globally while preserving
an equitable fishing system. Weighing these
issues, New Zealand has developed a system
called the Quota Management System (QMS)
that serves as the backbone for fishing regula-
tions in its waters.
The Quota Management
System: A History
The QMS has had a complicated history in
New Zealand. First introduced in the Fisheries
Act of 1986, the QMS began from the follow-
ing clause:
The Minister may . . . specify separate total
allowable catches for separately defined
parts of any quota management area and
may define total allowable catches by ref-
erence to methods of taking fish or the
periods within which fish may be taken.
(Maori Act)
Though very general, this document established
the foundation of a quota-based system of reg-
ulation in New Zealand fisheries. Unfortunately,
the clause above did not mention any way for
the Minister of Fisheries to change the quota
once it was set. The inability to change the
different fishing quotas made the system unus-
able for the first ten years it was in place. How-
ever, with the Fisheries Act of 1996, the Gov-
ernor-General4 was given the power to change
the quotas in the different Quota Management
Areas (QMA) if recommended by the Minister of
Fisheries. While there were several future
amendments to clarify the Fisheries Act of 1996,
this new clause made the QMS much more flex-
ible and allowed the Minister to use the QMS
to effectively begin regulating fisheries in New
Zealand. (Lock and Leslie, p. 5)
The Concept of the QMS
The quota for each species of fish repre-
sents the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), which
is the maximum tonnage of a specific species
of fish that may be caught in a given year.
Each TAC, which is set by the Minister of Fish-
eries, is calculated using mathematical mod-
els of fish populations over time. These mod-
els use stochastic methods5 and consider a wide
range of parameters, such as natural mortality
rates, spawning rates, exploitation rates (rates
at which fish die due to fishing), and the age
structure of the species. (Starfish . . .) Once
the TACs for all the species under the QMS
are calculated, each TAC is then broken down
further into three parts: the Total Allowable
Commercial Catch (TACC), the Maori quota, and
a recreational fishing allowance. (Lock and
Leslie, pp. 32–33)
The QMS is best explained by analyzing the
mainstream commercial fishing companies and
the TACC. Among the three different types of
quota, which vary depending on the year and the
species of fish, the TACC typically represents
about 75 percent of the total TAC. Once the
TACC is established for the year, the value of the
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) and the
Annual Catch Entitlements (ACE) are deter-
mined. An ITQ is effectively the individual right
of the owner6 to fish a percentage of the TACC
in perpetuity. The ITQ, however, is not the direct
right to catch a specific tonnage of fish. The
direct quota instrument, the Annual Catch Enti-
tlement (ACE), gives the owner the right to
catch a specified tonnage of fish for one year
at a given TACC. To explain further, the ITQ
itself does not grant the right to catch a desig-
nated amount of fish; rather, every year it gen-
erates an ACE for the owner that he or she
can either use or sell. Therefore, the ITQ, which
generates a new ACE every year in perpetuity,
essentially represents the right to fish a percent-
age of the TACC for a given species of fish for-
ever. (Lock and Leslie, pp. 17–18) For exam-
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4The Governor-General acts as the Head of State for NZ.
5Different than deterministic methods, stochastic meth-
ods are a class of statistical processes that include uncertainty.
6ITQs and ACEs are typically owned by fishing com-
panies; however, as will be discussed later in the article,
other entities, such as individuals or tribes, can also own
these fishing rights.
ple, if a fisherman owns an ITQ representing 8
percent of the TACC for cod and the TACC for
the year is 10,000 tons for cod, the ITQ gener-
ates an ACE for the owner representing a quota
of 800 tons of cod for that year. If in the fol-
lowing year the TACC changes to 11,000 tons of
cod, the fisherman’s ITQ will again generate
an ACE; however, the ACE generated in the
following year will represent 880 tons of cod.
In addition to using the ITQs and ACEs
to catch fish, a company can choose to buy, sell,
or lease these instruments on the open mar-
ket. In fact, there is currently a very large
market for ITQs and ACEs in New Zealand.
The value of an ACE can be calculated by assum-
ing a market price for the given species and
deducting the cost of catching and processing
the fish. The assumption of a market price
allows people to invest short term in different
species of fish. For instance, if an investor
believes that the market price of rock lobster
is going to rise, the investor can buy an ACE
while the price is still low and sell it once the
price has risen. Though much more speculative,
ITQs can be valued in a similar way. By specu-
lating on the future TACCs and the future
market price for a given species of fish, one
can calculate the present value of the yearly
ACEs and determine the value of an ITQ. (Lock
and Leslie, pp. 20–22) In effect, the ITQs are very
similar to financial perpetuities7 except, instead
of the value changing with interest rates, the
value changes with the year-to-year TACCs
and the changing value of the species. (Neher et
al., pp. 147–48)
The distinction between the ITQ and the
ACE has two major advantages. First, by dis-
tinguishing between the two, fishing companies
are able to make shorter term investments in
certain species of fish by purchasing an ACE
as opposed to the long term investment of
purchasing an ITQ. Second, this provides a
way for fishermen who have overfished or
underfished their own ACE to buy or sell an
additional fishing allowance just for that one
year. Since it is difficult to know exactly how
many fish are on board while at sea, fisher-
men often accidentally overfish their own ACE
in a given year. To avoid paying heavy fees for
overfishing, a company can buy an additional
ACE from other companies to cover the addi-
tional fish it caught. The separation of the ITQ
and the ACE, then, allows both the market
and the industry to function more efficiently
(Organisation . . . , pp. 5–8).
Regulation of New Zealand Fisheries
This somewhat complex quota system
hinges upon a reliable method of regulation. In
theory, the QMS provides an ideal system in
which the Minister of Fisheries, with the help
of New Zealand biologists and fishing experts, can
directly control the tonnage of each species of fish
caught in a given year. The success of the system,
however, depends on a reliable means of enforce-
ment. New Zealand currently has a dock sur-
veillance and tracking system in place that allows
the government to keep track of the tonnage of
fish caught by New Zealand fishermen.
In addition to surveillance, another major
challenge lies in developing a way to solve what
is known as the “Catch-Balancing Regime.”
(Newell, p. 43) The Catch-Balancing Regime
involves setting ideal rates for overfishing fees.
In New Zealand, these rates are commonly
referred to as “deemed values.” The primary
function of deemed values is to remove the
incentive of fishermen to catch different species
of fish without the required ACE. Since the
incentive itself is driven by the economic ben-
efit fishermen get by overfishing highly valued
fish, the best solution is to directly remove
that economic benefit. While quota suspensions,
fishing bans, and criminal penalties do some-
times occur, the primary method of regulating
deliberate overfishing is through deemed values.
Deemed values, however, must be set so that
fishermen who accidentally catch too many
fish do not just throw the excess fish back over-
board. This undesired catch, which can be either
excess fish or non-target fish, is commonly
referred to as the “by-catch.” The by-catch often
dies in the catching process, and, if still alive
when thrown back into the sea, is usually far
away from its original habitat. Deemed values
must be set at precisely the right levels as to dis-
courage both overfishing and discarding of the
by-catch. (Newell, pp. 44–45)
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7A financial perpetuity, though rarely used in prac-
tice, is a never-ending annual stream of fixed cash payments.
The present value of this financial instrument can be calcu-
lated by dividing the annual payment by the current risk-
free interest rate.
As stated above, deemed values are adjusted
overfishing rates; the name “deemed values”
comes from the way in which the rates are
adjusted. In order to effectively discourage
both overfishing and discarding of the by-
catch, deemed values are dependent on many dif-
ferent criteria, including the tonnage of overfish-
ing as a percentage of the fisherman’s ACE, the
value of the species, the amount of informa-
tion available on the fishery status, and the
typical level of by-catch associated with the
species. As shown in Table 1, fish species are clas-
sified into one of the four categories based on the
above criteria.
These four main categories establish the
base of the deemed value structure. The high-
value stocks have the most stringent regulations:
overfishing fees start around twice the current
market price and increase rapidly with the quan-
tity of overfishing. Since the high-valued species
are the most consistently exploited, the fees and
regulations ensure that overfishing these stocks
is in no way economically beneficial to the
fishermen. On the other hand, the low-knowl-
edge and low/medium-value stocks have very
light regulations. Since there is little indica-
tion that these species of fish are endangered and
their value is typically low, overfishing of these
stocks does not pose as serious a threat in com-
parison to the high-valued stocks. Consequently,
these deemed values are more intended to dis-
courage discarding of by-catch and are, on aver-
age, about 50 percent of the market price of
the fish. All other species of fish fall in between
these three main categories. Since regulations
of these stocks must discourage both overfish-
ing and discarding of the by-catch, setting eco-
nomically efficient deemed values is difficult.
Through rigorous economic analysis, deemed
values are typically 75 percent of the port price
and increase moderately with quantity of over-
fishing. (Newell, pp. 55–58)
Traditional Maori Fisheries
As stated above, each year the TAC is bro-
ken down into the TACC, the recreational quota,
and the Maori quota. The Maori quota repre-
sents the percentage of total TAC for all species
that is allocated to Maori tribes (iwi) through
the transfer of ITQs. The complexity of the QMS,
however, makes direct ownership of ITQs by cer-
tain iwi, who may not have the capacity to
efficiently harvest a quota, economically detri-
mental to the entire New Zealand fishing
industry.
The Evolving Maori Quota
The Maori quota, which was established in
1840, was by no means a quota in the general
sense of the word. According to the Treaty of
Waitangi, Maori were given “the full, exclu-
sive, and undisturbed possession of their . . . fish-
19
Category
High-value, single-species fisheries stocks
Low-knowledge stocks
Low/medium-value by-catch stocks
All other (most) stocks
Definition
High value (port price and ACE value); taken 
primarily with little by-catch
Stocks with relatively little information on 
the fishery status; no sustainability concerns
Low/medium value; majority of the catch 
taken as by-catch; TAC to be reviewed in the 
next few years; no sustainability concerns
Stocks that do not necessarily have a high 
unit value and for which there is adequate 
information for the Ministry of Fisheries to 
have confidence in the TACC
Table 1
Classification of NZ’s Fish
Source: Newell, p. 56.
eries and other possessions.” (History Group . . .)
As New Zealand evolved, pakehas (people of
European descent) began seeking fishing rights
of their own. The first violation of the original
Maori quota occurred with the Fisheries Act
of 1983, which required all NZ fishermen to own
fishing permits. These permits were given to any
fisherman who made at least $10,000 per year
fishing, or whose income was at least 80 percent
dependent on fishing. (Lock and Leslie, pp.
12–13) Many Maori, who made their living fish-
ing for their individual tribes, were denied
fishing permits and left without work. Three
years later (1986) the QMS was first introduced,
and the initial quota was allocated to fishermen
based upon the amount of fish caught in pre-
vious years. Since few Maori had fishing per-
mits, the majority missed out on the first allo-
cation of ITQs. The next several years included
many investigations, dialogues, and negotiations
between Maori organizations and the govern-
ment. Though there were some intermediate
treaties, Maori fishing rights were to an extent
restored in 1992 with the Treaty of Waitangi
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act. This act
settled all prior claims to Maori fishing rights,
released the government from obligations
detailed in the Treaty of Waitangi in regard to
Maori fishing, and redefined Maori fishing rights
for the future. In return, the Maori were given
financial help from the government to buy
Sealord Products LTD, which owned 25 percent
of all fishing quotas at the time. They were
also given 20 percent of the total fishing quota
for any new species introduced into the QMS.
These assets were transferred to the reformed
Maori Fisheries Commission, renamed Te Ohu
Kai Moana. The settlement of traditional and
commercial Maori claims allowed the govern-
ment to develop the QMS, which was fully
implemented four years later in the Fisheries
Act of 1996. (Day, pp. 1–3)
The Maori Fisheries Act of 2004
The Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act
clearly defined Maori fishing rights for the
future. The issue was no longer a lack of fishing
rights and quotas, but that there was no way
of effectively managing and distributing the col-
lective Maori quota to the individual iwi. Prob-
lems included preserving their new fishing
rights, educating iwi about effectively using
their quotas, commercially managing the value
of the entire Maori quota in the new complex
QMS, and ensuring that the solutions to these
problems had the iwi’s best interests at heart.
Up until the Maori Fisheries Act of 2004, the
only organization that managed these problems
was Te Ohu Kai Moana, the commission estab-
lished after the Settlement Act in 1992. The
Maori Fisheries Act of 2004 established four new
organizations (as will be discussed below), each
with a specialized purpose, but all of which
fought for the rights and progress of the iwi.
(“The Maori Act . . .”)
Te Ohu Kaimoana8 and
Its Structure
The Maori Fisheries Act of 2004, though
containing a detailed list of duties and goals
for each organization, created a very general
structure of governance for the Maori fishing
rights, as shown in Figure 2. Te Ohu Kaimoana
(Te Ohu) is no longer responsible for all aspects
of Maori fishing rights, but currently serves as
the main governing body. Te Ohu is responsible
for giving direction to the organizations below
it and ensuring the iwi are getting the help they
need to effectively use their resources. Te Kawai
Taumata is the liaison between the iwi them-
selves and Te Ohu. Te Kawai Taumata is an
electoral college with 11 representatives elected
by the chiefs of the iwi and is solely responsi-
ble for appointing and removing directors of
Te Ohu. (Te Ohu Kaimoana)
There are three main organizations below
Te Ohu that perform specialized tasks. The
first two, Te Wai Maori Trust and Te Putea
Whakatupu Trust, are focused on educating the
Maori on different aspects of the fishing indus-
try. Te Wai Maori Trust is responsible for man-
aging the trust fund to advance Maori inter-
ests in freshwater fisheries; this includes
“research and education related to Maori inter-
ests in freshwater fishing, protection and
enhancement of freshwater fisheries tradition-
ally supported by the iwi, and promoting the
establishment of new freshwater fisheries.”
(Te Wai Maori, p. 6) Similarly, Te Putea
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8Note that Te Ohu Kaimoana, though spelled slightly
differently, is the same organization as Te Ohu Kai Moana.
Whakatupu Trust is responsible for educating
the Maori on the fishing industry, but focuses
on creating Maori leaders within the fishing
industry through different leadership programs
and educational opportunities. (Te Putea
Whakatupu) As compared to Te Wai Maori,
which focuses on developing the resource, Te
Putea Whakatupu focuses on developing the
people.
In addition to these two Maori develop-
ment organizations, Aotearoa Fisheries LTD
(Aotearoa) is responsible for maximizing the
value of the Maori quota. Aotearoa is actively
involved in the QMS and provides the finan-
cial and economic support for Te Ohu. Cur-
rently, Aotearoa owns 50 percent of Sealord and
Prepared Foods Ltd, and 100 percent of Moana
Pacific Fisheries, Chatham Processing, Pacific
Marine Farms, and Prepared Foods Process-
ing. (Aotearoa . . .)
Iwi Registration
Though the Maori have rightfully regained
their fishing rights, many iwi are still not
ready to receive their assets; economic quota
ownership requires substantial knowledge of
the QMS, adequate fishing equipment, and
refined fishing processes. As a result, Te Ohu
has created an exhaustive registration process
that all iwi must complete that verifies the
tribe is prepared on all levels to receive a por-
tion of the Maori quota. Iwi that do not meet
all requirements receive help from Te Ohu
and other support organizations. These organ-
izations ensure that iwi seeking fishing
rights are willing to work toward preparing
their tribe to effectively use the assets. (Nga
Iwi . . .)
In summary, the Maori Fisheries Act of
2004 and the movement from one organization,
Te Ohu Kai Moana, to a system of well-aligned
organizations, each with very specific and
defined goals, allow for a more targeted
approach to Maori development in the fishing
industry. By implementing a stringent registra-
tion process and a strong support system, the
Maori are in a position to effectively use the
resources allocated by the Treaty of Waitangi
Settlement Act.
The Future of
New Zealand’s Fisheries
From an economic perspective, the QMS
is an extremely effective means of fishery reg-
ulation. Heavy overfishing fees ensure that fish-
ermen obtain ACEs, which are bought and
sold in an open market, for all of their catches.
The QMS maximizes economic value while
ensuring that each fishery sustains itself. There
are, however, several major problems that
continue to plague the QMS and its imple-
mentation in New Zealand.
Poaching and Dumping
As mentioned above, illegal fishing and
dumping (throwing fish back overboard to avoid
overfishing penalties) are two of the biggest
threats to the sustainability of fisheries all
over the world. This is especially true under the
QMS. According to Ministry of Fisheries exec-
utives, “Dumping of QMS species is viewed . . .
as possibly the greatest threat to the integrity of
the QMS system.” (“QMS Open . . .”) Further-
more, Jim Anderton, the Minister of Fisheries,
continues to express his “disgust” with the level
of poaching in New Zealand waters. According
to the Ministry of Fisheries, “Nearly three
hundred tons of paua9 are taken illegally . . .
every year.” (Anderton, p. 6)
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Figure 2. Structure of Te Ohu
Source: Te Ohu Kaimoana.
9Paua is a very valuable shellfish that is harvested
for its meat (abalone) and its colorful shell.
The TAC, which represents the total sus-
tainable yield for a given year, is completely allo-
cated to commercial, Maori, and recreational
fishers. Any unaccounted increase in total catch
or fishing mortality rates results in an unsus-
tainable total catch for a given fishery. Illegal
fishing creates a scenario where unknown
amounts of fish are caught without the knowl-
edge of the NZ government; and over time the
fishery stock experiences net negative growth.
Similarly, the dumping of fish in excess of a
given fisherman’s ACE introduces unaccounted
fishing mortality. Fishery officers measure a
fisherman’s catch by the amount landed (the
tonnage of fish unloaded at a dock). Should a
fisherman discard a portion of his catch at
sea, the discarded fish, which almost always
die in the catching process, represent an unac-
counted increase in fishing mortality. (Newell,
p. 19) In essence, this is worse than simple over-
fishing because the increase in fish mortality
is unknown and the dead fish are thrown away
and not harvested. These unknown variables
make efficient and sustainable fishery man-
agement nearly impossible.
The TAC and the Harvest
Strategy Standard
Differences between the TAC and the
actual total catch are often magnified due to the
manner in which the TAC is calculated. The
QMS attempts to provide sound biological reg-
ulation of fisheries while ensuring that the
industry remains economically efficient. The
TAC, therefore, is not set to maximize the stock
of each fishery, but instead to maximize the sus-
tainable tonnage of fish that can be caught in
a given year. In fact, fishery experts in New
Zealand have found that due to factors such as
food availability and egg survival, the maximum
sustainable yield (MSY) is typically 40 percent
of the undisturbed fish population. (Ministry
of Fisheries, p. 4) The TAC is then set so that the
total catch corresponds with the MSY.
On October 31, 2008, the Ministry of Fish-
eries announced the Harvest Strategy Standard,
which constitutes the formal process of set-
ting the TAC and determining whether different
fisheries are healthy, failing, or nearing extinc-
tion. Though the statistical theory behind this
process is very complex, the classification of
fishery health is based on the MSY: fisheries that
remain at the MSY are considered healthy; fish-
eries whose stocks fall to half of the MSY
undergo a rebuilding process; and fisheries that
decline to one-fourth of the MSY are typically
closed until stocks have again risen to an accept-
able level. Note that fisheries are only closed
when they decline to one-fourth MSY, or a mere
10 percent of their undisturbed stock. If in a
given year there is a spike in the amount of ille-
gal fishing and dumping and docks fail to record
all fish landed, there can be a significant threat
to the survival of a given fishery. (Ministry of
Fisheries, pp. 5–7)
Potential Shortcomings of the QMS
In general, the shortcomings of the QMS
can be broadly classified into two categories:
unaccounted catch and inadequate knowledge
of fisheries. Problems such as dumping, poach-
ing, and misreporting of catch all result in unac-
counted catch and cause fishing over the sus-
tainable yield. Furthermore, limited knowledge
of fisheries and the absence of reliable numbers
about certain fish, including spawning rates,
natural mortality rates, and current stock, result
in uncertainty and risk in setting the TAC.
To ensure that the QMS protects the
health of New Zealand’s fisheries and continues
to remain economically efficient, the follow-
ing suggestions10 must be considered in the
years to come:
• There must be an increase in fishery
monitoring to combat illegal fishing.
This could be accomplished by a GPS
method of tracking ships in NZ’s
waters, an increase in fishery officers,
and/or added incentives for current NZ
fishermen to report poaching through
the “Poaching Is Theft” program.11
• There must be an increase in fishery
security to prevent dumping. This
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10The suggestions are those of the author and are
based on sources both listed and unlisted in the refer-
ences.
11Created in October 2006, the “Poaching Is Theft”
program aims to raise public awareness of the impacts of
poaching in New Zealand’s waters. Part of the program ini-
tiative was the creation of a poaching hotline which all fish-
ers are encouraged to contact if poaching is suspected.
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could be done by providing incentives
and encouragement for NZ shipmates
to report dumping and/or a real-time
method of tracking catch.
• Fishery scientists and experts must
receive more research funding to bet-
ter estimate and determine the status
of NZ’s fisheries.
• Fisheries for which scientists have lim-
ited information must be harvested
more cautiously. Overfishing fees
should not be as low as they currently
are for fisheries that are classified as
“low-knowledge” stocks.
• Fishing techniques must be refined
and recreated to reduce undesired by
catch and prevent destruction of deli-
cate marine ecosystems.
Conclusion
Since its full implementation in the Fish-
eries Act of 1996, the QMS has revolutionized
fishery management in New Zealand. The sys-
tem has attacked one of the most difficult eco-
nomic problems, the tragedy of the commons,
and is currently providing NZ with a sound
foundation for economic growth in the fishing
industry. However, as I have outlined above,
there are still several problems with the actual
implementation of the QMS. Though institut-
ing an effective and efficient system is extremely
difficult considering the sheer size of New
Zealand’s EEZ, the success of the QMS hinges
on the elimination of poaching and dumping
and the continuing research into fisheries and
their interactions with the environment. Will
New Zealand find effective solutions to these
problems? Will the rapid growth of the fishing
industry outpace regulation and drastically
affect the health of NZ’s fisheries? What remains
clear is that New Zealand has once again
emerged at the forefront of sustainable practice
and proven its awareness that ecology and
economics are, as Leif Johansson observes,
indeed two sides of the same coin.
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